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Book Review: The Conceptual Foundations 
of Transitional Justice
March 31, 2019 
The Conceptual Foundations of Transitional Justice. By Colleen 
Murphy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
By: BALIGH BEN TALEB
Over the past few decades, communities around the world have em-
barked on transitions from conflict, repression and historical injustice 
to the rule of law and respect for human rights. Societies have estab-
lished legal institutions, such as truth-telling commissions and crimi-
nal trials to confront past abuses and attempt to transition into a new 
era of human dignity. Theorists have coined the term “transitional jus-
tice” to describe processes involved in confronting legacies of histor-
ical wrongdoings. Pressing questions raised in such contexts include: 
what does it mean to properly acknowledge past abuses and how does 
a community justify the choice of a specific response? It is not obvious 
which particular type of response is right, or wrong, as transitional 
justice may mean different things to different people in different con-
texts. The tasks of evaluating the motley epistemic meanings of “tran-
sitional justice” and the appropriate choices communities make are 
at the heart of Coleen Murphy’s elegant book, The Conceptual Foun-
dations of Transitional Justice. In a combination of rigorous theories 
and brilliant analytical writing, she argues that the just pursuit of so-
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Murphy begins by unpacking the logic, assumptions and philosoph-
ical backgrounds in which “ordinary” forms of retributive, distribu-
tive, or corrective justice are salient. The first two chapters trace the 
context, practices and deficiencies of these “ordinary” forms of jus-
tice in transitional circumstances. She argues that each of these famil-
iar forms developed a reducible approach to reckon with past abuses. 
This approach is understood as a “principled compromise” which fo-
cuses more on accountability. Justice is not however “an all-or-noth-
ing matter,” as Murphy pinpoints (159). Rather, it comes in degrees 
and is grounded in societal transformation. It is the lack of societal 
transformation that makes the nature of “ordinary” forms of justice 
unresponsive to the core moral questions confronting transitional so-
cieties. In Chapter One, Murphy explains why “ordinary” expectations 
of justice cannot be satisfied when four significant circumstances are 
in place: (1) pervasive structural inequality in the various economic, 
social, political, and legal institutions that shape the general interac-
tion among citizens and between citizens and officials; (2) normalized 
collective and political wrongdoing—the ability of state apparatuses 
and public expectations to banalize wrongdoing; (3) serious existen-
tial uncertainty—doubting whether transitional change will be a stable 
and lasting achievement; and (4) fundamental uncertainty about au-
thority—the standing of an old regime to respond to historical abuses 
is deeply contentious and morally difficult (41). For transitional jus-
tice to be useful, indicates Murphy, each of these circumstances must 
be addressed properly.
Chapter Two fleshes out why the proper acknowledgement of the 
problems that arise in transitional justice is not reducible to other 
familiar kinds of justice prevalent in “stable democracies.” Mur-
phy argues that these specific theories of justice are neither cru-
cial nor adequate for explaining transitional circumstances. That 
is, they are either based on victim-oriented claims of justice, as 
corrective justice avers; or perpetrator-oriented claims, as re-
tributive justice asserts. To Murphy, both approaches fall short 
when confronting the central moral question in transitional cir-
cumstances which is: how to pursue societal transformation? 
Chapters Three and Four explain why transitional justice is an exclu-
sive form of justice. Murphy offers an adequate account of the prin-
ciples that constitute transitional justice oriented towards a proper 
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response to the aforementioned fourfold set of transitional circum-
stances. In Chapter Three, she marshals evidence for the distinctive-
ness of transitional justice in the primary moral question confront-
ing societies in transition, which is not only societal transformation, 
but also the ethical requirements for pursuing societal change justly 
(194). Murphy suggests that the question of societal transformation 
is structurally analogous to the relationship between the jus ad bel-
lum and jus in bello components of just war theory; and to how those 
two “distinct sets of moral criteria interact” (115). The overall justi-
fication for a war may fail to be just in two contrasting ways: by fail-
ing to satisfy either of the sets of criteria. War may be justified from 
the jus ad bellum perspective (the recourse to war); but fails from a 
jus in bello prism (the conduct of war).
Using this structural analogy, Chapter Four demonstrates that so-
cietal transformation is the overarching moral goal of responses to 
wrongdoing in a manner that treats particular perpetrators and partic-
ular victims properly. Such pursuit is conditioned on the intrinsically 
just nature of the means that are used to address abuses. At its center, 
relationships among citizens and between citizens and officials should 
be transformed so that they are premised on respect, human agency, 
dignity, and reciprocity (194). Murphy describes this process as “rela-
tional transformation.” It hangs on the existence of three conditions: 
(1) the rule of law; (2) threshold levels of relational capabilities; and 
(3) the conditions under which political trust and trust responsive-
ness become reasonable (119). The absence or erosion of these three 
premises prevent the development of a just societal transformation.
Murphy demonstrates that an “ordinary” justice does not offer a 
comprehensive process of responding to wrongdoing because it treats 
issues of institutional reform as separate from the moral dilemmas 
that ensnare victims and perpetrators. In transitional justice how-
ever, she looks at the moral objectives, the design, implementation 
and evaluation of responses to victims and perpetrators as “holistic” 
(161). Failure to acknowledge and repair holistically the wrongdoing 
and damages inflicted upon people, institutions, infrastructure and 
relationships will jeopardize the future of a community.
Murphy writes with a clear audience in mind: philosophers, law-
yers, transitional justice theorists, policy makers, and citizens of tran-
sitional communities. At the author–audience discourse level, the 
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argument of transitional justice as a different kind of justice offers 
original and compelling grounds. Bolstering the relationship between 
the two dimensions of societal transformation and the fitting treat-
ment of past wrongdoings is at the core of transitional justice and po-
litical reconciliation. Under these circumstances, one may still won-
der how much to expect, morally, from “transitional justice” in dealing 
with colonial legacies and forced dispossession of Indigenous commu-
nities in settler societies. Where does transitional justice begin and 
where does it end? What are the appropriate standards of justice to 
use when evaluating the complex set of institutional and interpersonal 
in settler nations? Is still it erroneous to think of justice in “post” set-
tler colonial circumstances as involving a moral compromise between 
truth and justice?
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